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ABSTRACT 
Several previous studies have found considerable evidence 
of incumbency-oriented voting, i . e .  voting for or against the incumbent 
president and candidates of his party on the basis of fluctuations in 
economic conditions. This study explores the hypothesis that voting in 
response to economic conditions is often policy�oriented as well . 
Because of the different p olicy,priorities of the two major parties, 
voters who are concerned about unemployment are predicted to give 
greater support to Democratic candidates, while those concerned about 
inflation are predicted to vote more Republican. The analysis undertaken 
here maintains a key distinction which has emerged from previous work, 
and tests for electoral effects of inflation and unemployment as 1) 
problems which are personally troublesome to the individual, and as 
2) problems which are seen to be troublesome for the nation as a whole . 
The final section of this study turns to aggregate level data, and 
compares the performance of models �hich incorporate policy-oriented 
distinctions with models which �pacify incumbency-oriented effects only . 
These analyses do \Jneove� substantial support for the policy­
oriented hyp othesis , but such voting appears to have occurred primarily 
in response to unemployment .  Th•re were few instances a t  both the 
levels of personal economic prablelnS and of perceived national problems 
of inflation-sensitive voters supporting the Republicans , but that is all. 
Voters who had personally experienced unemployment, on the other hand, 
gave a modest but consistent boost to Democratic candidates in virtually 
every election. This effect was heavily supplemented in years of high 
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unemployment by the large percentage of voters who felt unemployment 
was a serious national problem and consequently voted heavily Democratic 
as well . The evidence which emerged at the aggregate level was very 
similar. The parties barely differed , if at all, in their vulnerability 
to inflation. Any rise in unemployment , however, would hurt Republican 
incumbents nearly twice as badly as it would Democratic incumbents . 
This study concludes by discussing the implications these findings 
have for our understanding of how economic conditions influence voting 
behavior in the American electorate. 
ACCOUNTING FOR THE ELECTORAL EFFECTS OF SHORT-TERM ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS: 
THE ROLE OF INCUMBENCY-ORIENTED AND POLICY-ORIENTED VOTING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most important subfields in public opinion/voting 
behavior to emerge in recent years concerns the political impact of 
economic conditions. Studies in this area have been motivated, in 
large part, by a desire to find individual level patterns of behavior 
which might account for the aggregate level relationships between the 
recent performance of the economy and the incumbent party's electoral 
fortunes. Several time series analyses have demonstrated that the 
incumbent president and congreesional candidates of his party fare 
much better at the polls during periods of prosperity than when 
economic conditions are poor (Kramer, 1971; Kramer and Lepper, 1972; 
Lepper, 1974; Tufte, 1975, 1978; Bloom and Price, 1975; Li, 1976; 
Fair, 1978). 
In their attempts to account for the aggregate level results, 
survey researchers immediately focus
'ed on the role of the individual's 
perceived financial situation. Thie seemed like a good place to 
start, given the availability 0£ an appropriate measure � every CPS 
National Election Study since 1956 has asked respondents whether or 
not the financial situation of themselves and their families had 
recently improved, stayed the same, or gotten worse -- and that this 
measure roughly resembled the aggregate level indicator which usually 
best predicted election outcomes, i.e. change in per capita real 
income. These studies posited that is those individuals most 
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dissatisfied with their own lot, whose recent economic fortunes have 
soured, who vote most heavily against the incumbent president and his 
party's congressional candidates. The party in power stumbles during 
recessions because there are more voters encountering personal 
economic difficulties. 
Several studies utilizing a wide range of statistical 
techniques have examined this measure, and have all reached similar 
conclusions. In some presidential elections voters who felt their 
financial situation had recently worsened were less supportive of the 
incumbent than voters who believed their financial situation had 
improved. But those who felt their financial situation had recently 
worsened rarely showed any inclination to punish congressional, 
senatorial, or gubenatorial candidates of the incumbent (president's) 
party (Ben-Gera Logan, 1977; Fiorina, 1978; Klorman, 1978; Kinder and 
Kiewiet, 1979). This pattern of weak, scattered effects of perceived 
financial trends at the individual level contrasts strongly with the 
robust aggregate level findings. The problem could lie with the 
measure, but considerable evidence indicates that this item does 
accurately reflect individuals' recent economic fortunes (Klorman, 
1978; Rosenstone et al. , 1978). 
In contrast, substantial empirical support has been generated 
for the proposition that it is individuals' views on how well the 
national economy as a whole has been performing which influences their 
voting decisions. Six CPS national election studies since 1962 have 
asked respondents the following question: 
Now turning to business conditions in the country as 
a whole • • • Would you say that at the present time 
business conditions are better or worse than they 
were a year ago? 
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In a fairly simple analysis, Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) found that 
voters who felt national business condtions had worsened were 
consistently more likely to vote against congressional candidates of 
the president's party than voters who believed conditions had 
improved. The evidence �as similarly supportive in Logan's (1977) 
analysis of senatorial races and in Fiorina's (1979) investigation of 
presidential elections. 
The results of these studies also indicate that other 
nationally- oriented economic assessments influence voting behavior, 
including ratings of the government's (presumably identified as the 
incumbent administration) recent performance in managing the economy, 
and judgments about which party could better cope with economic 
problems (Kinder and l.Ciewiet, 1979;·Fiorina, 1979). To be sure, these 
are not straightforward evaluations of economic conditions (either in 
one's own life or in the country as a whole) . Rather, they are 
evaluations of how "11'•11 various polit'ical actors handle econoJllic 
matters, and are obviously bound up with voters' general partisan 
predispositions and ov.rall evaluations of the incumbent president. 
But as Fiorina (1979) puts it, these evaluations "reflect economics as 
well as psychology" (p. 25) , for they are strongly informed by 
individuals' direct assessments of the country's and their own 
economic circumstances. These political-economic evaluations, then, 
are considerably more than rationalized partisanship or general affect 
toward the president extended into the domain of economics. 
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The reason why assessments of the national economy apparently 
have so much more of an effect upon voting than perceptions of one's 
own financial condition is probably contained in Sniderman and Brody's 
(1977) discussion of the "ethic of self-reliance." According to their 
line of reasoning, people may see the economic problems troubling them 
as general and widespread, as something they share with many other 
people; if so, they tend to believe the government could and should 
take action to alleviate them. Usually, though, they perceive their 
problems as rooted in the particular circumstances of their own life, 
not in the economy at large, and hence view governmental action as 
neither effective nor appropriate. Their data strongly supported 
their contention that "Americans in overwhelming numbers believe they 
ought to take care of their personal problems by themselves • • • 11 
(p. 501) . Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) make a similar point, arguing 
that in accounting for one's own personal economic fortunes, very 
local, idiosyncratic factors are usually an entirely sufficient 
explanation. Assessments of national economic conditions, on the 
other hand, are by definition perceptions of widespread, general 
phenomena. Political relevance is thus more readily apparent. For 
most people it is evidently much easier to make the connection between 
the incumbent administration and the performance of the national 
economy than the connection between the incumbent administration and 
their own economic situation. 
In short, survey researchers have been able to find 
considerable evidence of incumbency-oriented voting, i. e. voting for 
or against the incumbent president and candidates of his party on the 
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basis of fluctuations in economic conditions. Even though it is 
assessments of the national economy as a whole which the greater 
impact upon voting decisions, this evidence is obviously consistent 
with the aggregate level relationships Kramer and others have 
uncovered. In fact, it �ould seem to be as full an individual level 
account as necessary of an electorate acting, in Key's (1964) words, 
as "a rational god of vengeance and reward. " 
It is the contention of this paper, however, that the case is 
not closed. In strict logical terms, of course, it could never be 
closed completely. As Tufte (1975) puts it: 
Many different models of the underlying electorate are 
consistent with electoral outcomes which are collectively 
rational; and the observation of aggregate rationality 
clearly does not imply a unique specification or 
description of individual voters or of groups of voters 
making up the electorate. (p. 826) 
The basic hypothesis to be examined here is that in addition 
to incumbency-oriented voting. a suDstantial amount of voting in 
response to economic conditions is Rolicy-oriented, i.e. based upon 
the different policy priorit�es of the Democratic and Republican 
parties with respect to unemployment and inflation. So far the 
discussion has been in terms of voters responding to "the economy, " or 
"economic conditions. " But as Hibbs (1979) argues, "unemployment and 
inflation clearly are the variables preoccupying both policy makers 
and the mass public" (p. 708). To be sure, the classic 
Phillips curve relationship between the two has deteriorated; 
there has been a major secular increase in the rate of inflation since 
the mid-1960s, and it is possible to have simultaneously high and 
rising levels of both inflation and unemployment. But it is still the 
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case that medicine for one is usually bane for the other; policies to 
reduce unemployment typically do so by seeking to stimulate aggregate 
demand, while policies to lower inflation typically seek to depress 
aggregate demand. Again, in Hibbs' (1979) words: 
Although there is no fixed, stable trade-off between 
unemployment and inflation in the macro-economy, most 
economists and politicians recognize that full 
employment and price stability pose conflicting goals 
in the sense that it is difficult to made substantial 
progress on one problem without running risks with 
respect to the other. (p. 708) 
Futhermore, the major political parties have traditionally 
differed in the priority they assign to reducing inflation versus 
lowering unemployment. Compared to Republican administrations, 
Democratic adminstrations have been more sensitive to unemployment, 
and have been relatively more willing to risk some inflation to reduce 
it. Compared to Democratic administrations, though, Republican 
administrations have usually tolerated considerably more slack in the 
economy and thus unemployment to fight inflation. This difference in 
priorities finds expression, with varying degrees of clarity, in party 
platforms (Tufte, 1978), campaign rhetoric (White, 1961, 1973; 
Witcover, 1977), and in actual policy and policy outcomes (Sundquist, 
1968; Okun, 1973; Hibbs, 1977). 
As a consequence, when the parties' policies have gone awry it 
has tended to be in opposite directions. As Okun (1973) puts it: 
When the chips were down, the Democrats have taken their 
chances on inflation and the Republicans on unemployment 
and recession. For a generation, evey major mistake in 
economic policy under a Democratic president has taken 
the form of overstimulating the economy and every major 
mistake under a Republican president of overrestraining it. 
(p. 175) 
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Prosperity under a Democratic administration, to be sure, would be the 
same as under a Republican administration -- low unemployment, low 
inflation. Republican failures to achieve prosperity, however, have 
generally taken the form of recession and unemployment; Democratic 
failures, on the other hand, have appeared more frequently as spurts 
in the inflation rate. An examination of all non-war election years 
since 1932 reveals that in only two of the thirteen elections in which 
the incumbent president was a Democrat did the unemployment rate 
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increase from the previous years, but the inflation rate increased 
from the previous year nine of the thirteen times. The Republican 
record has perhaps been somewhat better on inflation, as the inflation 
rate increased from the previous year five out of nine elections in 
which the Republicans were incumbent. But it has clearly been worse 
with respect to unemployment, as that rate also increased from the 
previous year five out of the nine times. It seems quite reasonable 
to suspect, therefore, that voting in response to economic conditions 
is often policy- oriented: voters who are concerned about 
unemployment tend to give greater support to Democratic candidates, 
while those concerned about inflation tend to vote more Republican. 
If so, it could well be that a significant portion of the strong 
aggregate relationship between the state of the economy and the 
electoral fortunes of the incumbent party is produced by votes 
punishing the Democrats for inflation and the Republicans for 
unemployment. 
It should be stressed that it does not require voters to have 
a sophisticated understanding of macroeconomic policy for concerns 
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about inflation or unemployment to affect their voting decisions. Nor 
must they recognize that full employment and price stability pose 
conflicting goals. Rather, it requires only that the (1) see either 
inflation or unemployment as a serious problem and want to see it 
alleviated, and (2) that they perceive differences between the parties 
in the amount of effort and/or skill they apply in combatting that 
problem. 
This policy-oriented hypothesis would seem to imply, 
paradoxically, that when in office the Republicans could help 
themselves by allowing a high rate of inflation, while the Democrats 
could bolster their re-election chances by running up a high 
unemployment rate. 1 Such a "strategy," however, would almost 
certainly be counter-productive. A complete flip-flop on 
macroeconomic policy priorities would not only betray the party's key 
constituent groups, and alienate some of its· most dependable 
supporters, but the resultant uncertainty as to what the party could 
be expected to do in office would scare off many others (Downs, 1957). 
And as Okun (1973) points out, a party's long-term favorable image 
would surely be eroded by such policy failures. Any perception of the 
Republican administration as more coumitted to fighting inflation, for 
example, would inevitably fade in the face of a Republican 
administration which apparently tolerated a high rate of inflation. 
The more reasonable inference is that any given increment in the 
unemployment rate would hurt Republican incumbents more than 
Democratic incumbents, who in turn would suffer relatively greater 
damage from a given jump in the inflation rate. For according to the 
9 
policy-oriented voting hypothesis, voters in each case would perceive 
the out-party as able to apply more effort and/or skill in precisely 
the problem area in which the incumbents' efforts had failed. 
The analysis undertaken in this paper thus examines the 
hypothesis that voting in response to economic conditions is often 
policy-oriented. The evidence it seeks to uncover is of inflation­
sensitive voters showing disproportionately greater support for 
Republican candidates and of unemployment�sensitive voters exhibiting 
greater support for Democrats. The key distinction to emerge from 
previous studies of incumbency-oriented voting -- between personal 
economic fortunes and assessments of the national economy as a whole 
� will be maintained in this study. The next section will seek to 
uncover evidence of policy-oriented voting with respect to inflation 
and unemployment at the individual level. The survey data on which 
the analyses are based come from the biennial CPS American National 
Election Studies.2 The third section will return to the aggregate 
level, and compare the performance of models which incorporate 
policy-oriented distinctions with models which specify incumbency­
oriented effects only. 
II. THE EFFECTS OF CONCERNS OVER INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT UPON VOTING 
IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 
As pointed out in the introduction, several studies have 
investigated the influence of personal economic conditions upon voting 
and failed to detect much of an impact. In some presidential 
elections a modest effect was evidenced, but in most congressional, 
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senatorial, or gubernatorial races voters' assessments of their 
(family's) financial situation had little impact on their decisions to 
support or oppose the incumbent party. 
But what if voters were behaving in a policy-oriented fashion? 
One voter might report being worse off financially than a year ago 
because of being frequently laid off from work. Another voter might 
also report being worse off, but believe his or her problems emanated 
from rising food, fuel, or housing prices. Their responses to the 
personal finances item would be identical, but the first would vote 
Democratic, the second Republican. Thus the electoral effects of 
personal economic misfortunes, though they might be considerable, 
would go undetected in an analysis of incumbency-oriented voting based 
upon this survey item. 
Almost all studies in this field have relied upon this same 
measure of personal (family) finances. One previous study, though � 
that of Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) � did look specifically at personal 
difficulties due to unemployment. Their analysis utilized a dummy 
variable which registered whether or not the respondent's head of 
household had been out of work at some time in the last year or two. 
They found that this measure did no better than the family finances 
item in predicting votes for or against the incumbent party's 
candidates. When their results are examined from the perspective of 
policy-oriented voting, however, a striking pattern emerges. After 
making a few desirable changes in their estimation procedures, these 
results are shown in Table 1.3 The top numbers in each entry are the 
probit estimates, the numbers in parentheses beneath them are standard 
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errors. As in their original analysis, the personal (family) finances 
item was also specified (the "better off" category takes on the value 
of 1, "same" the value of 3, and "worse off" the value of 5) as were 
party identification terms. 4 Estimates of the latter, of course, were 
always quite large and statist ically significant. This has not direct 
bearing on the analysis here, however, and so for the sake of 
conciseness these estimates are not reported. Reported votes for 
Democratic candidates are represented by O, reported Republican votes 
' 
by 1, so positive signs are in a pro-Republican direction. 
[Table 1 about here] 
What is striking about the evidence in Table 1, of course, is 
that the sign of the head of household's unemployment term is in a 
negative and t hus pro-Democratic direction in eighteen of the nineteen 
elections studied. The only exception is the 1968 presidential race, 
an election in which George Wallace made substantial inroads into the 
Democratic party's traditional blue collar constituency. Whet her or 
not a Democrat sat in the White House, respondents from households 
whose breadwinner had been out of work consistently gave more support 
to candidates of the Democratic party. The estimates of the personal 
(family) finances term, on the other hand, were generally in keeping 
with incumbency-oriented voting. In all presidential elections and in 
eight of the twelve congressional elections, those respondents who 
reported being worse off financially, for whatever reason, tended to 
vote against the incumbent party (as evidenced by signs of the 
estimat es) . As was the case in several previous studies, this effect 
was stronger in presidential elections than in congressional; four of 
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the six president ial election estimates were in the correct 
(incumbency-oriented) direction and statistically significant, but 
only three of the twelve congressional terms were (the significant 
1966 estimate was in the wrong direction) . 
Estimates of the head of house�old's unemployment term were 
thus impressive in the consistency of their pro-Democratic direction. 
The strength of this support for Democratic candidates, however, was 
not. The size of the probit estimates varied widely � in six 
elect ions the estimates exceed . 5, but in four others they are less 
than . 1. The difference between effects of these sizes is 
substantial. If there is a 50 percent chance that a certain voter 
will vote Democratic, an estimate of . 5  w0uld, everything else held 
constant, increase his probability of voting Democratic to 69. 2 
percent; an estimate of . 1  would move it up to only 54. 1 percent. 
Another indication of how weak the estimates· often are is the fact 
that only five of the nineteen attain conventional levels of 
statist ical significance. True, in 1956 and 1966 the unemployment 
measure reflects current status only, and the low N (in 1956 only 15 
respondent s reported that their head of household was currently 
unemployed) and resultant large standard error make statistical 
significance difficult to achieve. But low N is usually not the 
problem; an average of 40 voters in the surveys report their head of 
household has been out of work in the previous six months, and when 
the previous year is considered the average is 108. So while voters 
from families which have been affect ed by unemployment appear to 
consistently give greater support to Democratic candidates, the 
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magnitude of this support is only occasionally impressive. 
Some of the variation in the political impact of personal 
difficulties with unemployment is systematic. First, the impact 
appears somewhat stronger in presidential elections than in 
congressional. Weighting each estimate by the inverse of its standard 
error, the mean estimates were -. 383 and -.235 respectively. This 
makes sense, given the lower salience of congressional races (Stokes 
and Miller, 1962) , and that the president is probably held more 
directly accountable for economic conditions than his party's House 
candidates. Secondly, the shorter the retrospective time frame, the 
larger the estimate. Probit estimates in the congressional election 
series averaged only -. 131 when the measure incorporated any bouts of 
unemployment in the previous year, but -.295 when only the previous 
six months were considered. And although the low Ns necessitate 
caution, the two measures which are based upon current status averaged 
-.642. Although hardly conclusive, these figures do suggest that when 
it comes to personal economic difficulties, voters have short memories 
they react strongly to current or recently encountered 
unemployment, but not to unemployment experienced several months prior 
to the election. 
Aggregate level studies in this area have also suggested that 
the electorate has a short memory. Pair (1978) concluded that the 
electorate discounted past experiences very quickly; although there 
are not enough data to derive very precise estimates, his analysis 
found that economic conditions in the second and third quarters of the 
election year best predicted votes for president. Similarly, Kernell 
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(1978) found that inflation and unemployment best predicted 
presidential popularity when change in their levels across the 
previous six months was considered. These findings about the 
electorate as a whole thus accord nicely with this study's findings 
about individual voters. 
Given how rapidly such difficulties appear to be discounted, 
it is evident that the effect of personally experienced unemployment 
upon election outcomes would be quite small. Still, the support these 
data on personal unemployment difficulties have generated for the 
policy-oriented hypothesis is considerably greater than the support 
other data on personal economic fortunes have given the incumbency­
oriented hypothesis. 
There are obviously some shortcomings in this analysis. 
First, its evidential base concerns only the unemployment side of the 
hypothesis; the corollary is that voters for whom inflation is a 
serious personal problem give greater support to the Republicans. 
Secondly, only personal level economic difficulties have been 
investigated. As indicated in the introduction, it has instead been 
assessments of the national economy as a whole which have produced the 
strongest evidence of incumbency-oriented voting. These deficiencies 
will be remedied by 1) analyzing direct indicators of personal 
difficulties due to inflation as well as unemployment, and by 2) 
investigating the effects upon voting of individual's perceptions of 
unemployment or inflation as problems troubling the nation as a whole. 
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Personal Economic Problems 
What is needed in order to conduct a more compelling test of 
the policy-oriented hypothesis at the level of personally experienced 
economic problems is a means of isolating those voters who find 
inflation or unemployment salient and troublesome. In three of the 
CPS election studies -- 1972, 1974, and 1976 � this could be done on 
the basis of respondents' answers to the following set of questions: 
Let's change the subject for a moment. We like to have people 
tell us what sorts of problems they have to deal with in their 
daily lives. Can you tell me what some of the problems are 
that you face these days in your life' • • • Anything else? 
Although these questions did not specifically ref er to economic 
problems, well over half the problems respondents mentioned were 
economic in nature. 
Unfortunately, the coding categories developed by the CPS for 
these items were, for present purposes, not appropriate. In several 
important instances responses which should have been kept separate 
were grouped together. It was therefore necessary to recode the 
responses as they appeared on the original protocols. 5 References to 
unemployment and inflation were naturally sorted out, but categories 
of other important economic problems were derived from the verbatim 
interview data as well. The coding scheme which was thus developed, 
along with the marginal frequencies from all three years, is presented 
in Table 2. What are reported are the respondents' most important 
personal economic problems. If a respondent mentioned some 
noneconomic problem as the most important one he or she faced, e. g. 
poor health, but also mentioned an economic problem, the economic 
problem was the one which was coded here. 
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[Table 2 about here] 
As Table 2 shows, respondents cited inflation more frequently 
than any other economic problem. This category includes all 
references to high or rising prices, either in general or for specific 
commodities. Economists, of course, express puzzlement that anyone 
should be much concerned about inflation in and of itself. What 
should worry people is the failure of their wage and salary increases 
to match price increases -- a declining real income -- and not the 
nominal price level. But as long as inflation is present, the typical 
way real incomes are reduced is for price inflation to outpace wage 
increases. People may thus be confusing the product (declining real 
income) with the process (inflation). 
But as the presence of the category in Table 2 indicates, 
between five and seven percent of the respondents did refer explicitly 
to a declining real income. A variety of responses were subsumed 
under this category: failure of wages to keep up with price 
increases, living on a fixed income, declining purchasing power, 
failing to maintain the standard of living one is accustomed to, or 
having great difficulty in doing so. 
It makes sense on two grounds to differentiate between these 
respondents and those who simply cited high or rising prices as their 
worst problem. First, such respondents appeared to be worse off in 
objective terms; references to a declining real income were 
considerably more frequent in low income categories than in high, and 
more frequent among retirees as well. When asked to compare their 
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family's financial present financial situation with that of a year 
ago, in 1976 49 percent of the respondents in this category said it 
had worsened; only 33 percent in the inflation category reported being 
worse off, a figure barely distinguishable from the sample average of 
30 percent. Secondly, people who referred to a declining real income 
may have been more sophisticated in perceiving the true nature of 
their problems. There was, however, no relationship between the 
frequency with which respondents referred to this problem and their 
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level of educational attainment. At any rate, it seems quite 
plausible to suspect that the political response to perceived economic 
problems of this nature may differ from that of respondents who simply 
cited inflation. 
The unemployment related category is broadly defined. It 
contains all respondents who felt their worst economic problem was 
that they (or someone in their family) were laid off, unemployed, 
unable to find a job, worried by the threat of unemployment in the 
near future, or underemployed, i. e. unable to work enough hours. The 
percentages of respondents in this category closely paralleled the 
objective rates of unemployment among different racial and 
occupational groups. According to the 1976 cross- sectional data, 
blacks were more than twice as likely as whites to refer to 
unemployment -- 7,9 percent to 3. 7 percent. Among occupational 
categories the percentages ranged from only 1. 6 percent of managerial-
administrative personnel to 14. 0 percent of nonfarm laborers. 
Yet despite the breadth of this definition, only between 3,4 
percent and 4,4 percent fell into this category. Perhaps, as 
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conservative economists and politicians claim, unemployment 
compensation and other benefits have substantially eased the burden of 
joblessness. And as the previous findings suggested, experiences with 
unemployment are evidently quickly discounted. Whatever the reason, 
the percentage of respondents naming unemployment their worst problem 
was lower than the objective rate of unemployment. 
Similarly, not too many respondents referred to� as their 
worst personal economic problem. · A residual category, general or 
miscellaneous economic problems, was largely composed of vague 
references to such things as "bills, " "finances, " "money, " "money 
problems, " or "not making enough money. " AB Table 2 shows, the 
percentage of respondents falling into this category was remarkably 
stable from year to year -- around 20 percent each time. In fact, the 
size of most categories remained quite stable from year to year; only 
the percentage citing inflation fluctuated much. Fluctuations in the 
size of that category, though, clearly reflected the actual rates of 
inflation which obtained in 1972, 1974, and 1976. 
Perceived National Economic Problems 
As noted earlier, in several previous studies of incumbency-
oriented voting it was individual's assessments of how well the 
national economy as a whole was performing, not their evaluations of 
recent trends in their own personal (family) financial situation, 
which most strongly affected their voting decisions. This bodes well 
for the present analysis of policy-oriented voting -- that voters 
apparently respond to the general state of the economy certainly 
suggests that their perceptions of specific national economic problems 
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matter as well. As at the personal level, though, the incumbency-
oriented and policy-oriented hypotheses are separate and distinct. 
Thus the good showing of the former is no guarantee the latter will 
meet with similar success. 
The comparison between the personal level and national level 
versions of the policy-oriented hypothesis should obviously be a fair 
one. A desideratum for the following analysis, therefore, is to 
develop meaures of national economic problem concerns which are as 
similar as possible to the personal economic problem measures. 
Fortunately, with one exception (1962) all CPS Election Studies since 
1958 have contained question suitable for present purposes. Like the 
personal problems questions, they were all open-ended, and imposed a 
minimum of constraint on the respondent's answers. Not only does this 
provide assurance that the problems cited are salient to the 
respondents, it also allows them to frame the issues in their own way. 
As Repass (1971) points out, the closed-ended type of questions around 
which the virulent "issue voting" controversy revolves are wanting in 
both regards. 
The various questions used were as follows: 
What do you think are the most important problems facing 
this county? (1972, 1974, 1976, 1978), 
What do you personally feel are the most important 
problems which the government in Washington should try 
to take care of? (1966, 1968, 1970) . 
What would you personally feel are the most important 
problems the government should try to take care of when 
the new President and Congress take off ice in January? 
(1960, 1964). 
Now, how about problems here at home inside the United 
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States in the past year or so • • • Would you say that 
things in general have been going along better than they 
were a year ago, not as well as before, or have they 
stayed about the same? Row is that? (1958). 
The coding scheme derived from the available CPS categories 
and marginal frequencies for each year are presented in Table 3. As 
before, it is the most important economic problems respondents cited 
which are reported, if a noneconomic problem (e. g. crime) was deemed 
most important, but an economic problem was also mentioned, the 
economic problem was the one which was coded. 6 
[Table 3 about here] 
Most categories require little explanation. The inflation 
category includes all those who named high or rising prices the most 
troublesome national economic problem. Occasionally they referred to 
particular goods or services, but most references concerned prices in 
general. Included under unemployment are respondents who felt the 
government should create more jobs, provide job retraining, or grant 
aid to depressed areas; most, though, simply cited unemployment. As 
the figures in Table 3 clearly show, the number of respondents who 
named either of these two economic problems the most important closely 
tracked the actual inflation and unemployment rates in these years. 
The unemployment figures peaked in 1958 and 1976, inflation in 1974 
and 1978. It should be noted that in the three years in which 
comparisons are possible (1972, 1974, 1976) the number of respondents 
who cited inflation or unemployment at the national level was always 
much larger than the number who named them as their most serious a 
personal problem. The potential impact of the national level 
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perceptions upon elections is thus much greater. Only a small 
percentage of respondents, for example, cited unemployment as a 
personal problem, but in 1958 and 1976 it was cited more frequently at 
the national level than any other problem. 
As at the personal level, few respondents felt � were the 
most important national economic problem. Under more government 
programs were respondents who believed that the federal government 
should do more to alleviate social problems; Most of them advocated 
new or enlarged federal programs in particular areas: education, 
housing, transportation, health and medical care, urban renewal, 
poverty programs, aid to minorities, or social security. The category 
also included those who felt the federal government should increase 
its spending in order to stimulate the economy, and those who felt 
government should exert more control or regulatory power over private 
business. Individuals in the next category, however, believed that a 
large and growing public sector was precisely what was wrong with this 
country. A variety of responses fell under the rubric of � 
government spending the federal government's budget deficits, a 
lack of fiscal responsibility, waste and inefficiency in the 
bureaucracy, creeping socialism, or too much government interference 
into private enterprise. As Table 3 shows, this category was never a 
very large one, ranging from virtually zero in some years to a high of 
7. 2 percent in 1966. 
Parties of the left typically favor expansion of the size and 
scope of the public sector, while parties of the right oppose it 
(Bibbs, 1978; Cameron, 1978). Given the centrality of this issue in 
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domestic policy debate it is thus important for the following analysis 
that these categorical variables be specified. 7 As Table 3 shows, 
percentage of respondents in the two public sector categories dropped 
off considerably after 1970. It seems likely that most prople view 
inflation, unemployment, or the general state of the economy as prior 
concerns, which, as the economy stumbled through the Seventies, took 
precedence over questions about the need for additional government 
programs. 
Finally, most respondents included in the next category, 
general economic problems, referred simply to "the economy. " The few 
who cited several other problems, such as interest rates, a bearish 
stock market, or balance of payments deficits were also included. 
This category was obviously quite small during the prosperous Sixties, 
but by 1974 over a quarter of the respondents were included in it. As 
was also the case at the personal level, no obvious policy-oriented 
hypotheses can be made about respondents who cited general or 
miscellaneous economic problems. It seems reasonable to posit, 
though, that such voters, concerned about the economy in general but 
not attune to a specific problem, would tend to vote against the 
incumbent president and his party's candidates. 
Non-economic problems, of course, are everything else: the 
Vietnam War, foreign affairs, national defense, crime, drug abuse, 
public disorder, and a host of other things. Not surprisingly, this 
catch-all category was largest in the tumultuous, war-torn, but 
prosperous year of 1968, smallest in the peaceful but economically 
troubled period beginning in 1974. 
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Sources of National Economic Problem Perceptions 
One of the more intriguing findings reported in Kinder and 
Kiewiet's (1979) study was the weakness of the relationship between 
respondents' assessments of their own economic conditions and their 
preceptions of the state of the economy; their views on whether or not 
national business conditions had recently worsened or improved had 
little to do with their own (family's) financial situation. 
When specific economic problems were considered, however, a 
somewhat stronger relationship was present. Probit analyses of 
perceptions of enemployment and inflation as national problems 
indicated that these perceptions were influenced by personal 
experiences. (For the sake of brevity only a summary of these 
analyses can be reported � a detailed report of the estimation 
procedures and results is available from the author upon request. ) 
Respondents who named unemployment at the personal level were 
considerably more likely to cite it at the national level as well. 
The same was true for inflation. Furthermore, several important group 
differences were present � blacks, union members, low income, and low 
education respondents were·more likely than average to cite 
unemployment, while farmers, managerial-administrative personnel and 
Southerners were less likely. These differences obviously make sense 
in light of what we know about the way the costs of unemployment are 
distributed. On the other hand, there were virtually no group 
differences present in the propensity of respondents to cite inflation 
as a national problem; blacks were less likely than average, but only 
slightly so. A similar pattern appeared when respondents' partisan 
predilections were considered. Democrats were somewhat more likely to 
name unemployment the nation's most serious problem, but they did not 
differ from Republicans in their propensity to cite inflation. 
The strength of these associations between perceived national 
economic problems and other variables, though, should not be 
overstated. Despite the greater propensity of respondents who had 
referred to inflation and unemployment as personal problems to also 
cite them at the national level,· it is also the case that the large 
majority who did name one of these two maladies at the national level 
had not referred to them as personal problems. Furthermore, the 
impact of party identification upon perceptions of national economic 
problems was quite small in comparison to the overall variation in 
perceptions of inflation and unemployment from year to year. As 
previous studies have shown, perceptions of national economic 
problems, though affected to some degree by the respondents' personal 
economic experiences, socioeconomic background, and party 
affiliations, closely reflect objective economic conditions (Repass, 
1971; Miller and Miller, 1977). 
A couple of other matters must be considered before the 
electoral effects of concern over inflation and unemployment can be 
estimated. First, although the problem indicators are evidently not 
very susceptible to partisan coloration (indeed, the questions from 
which the indicators were derived, referring to neither parties, 
issues, nor candidates, clearly should have kept rationalization to a 
minimum) , the reverse might be a problem. Several recent studies have 
shown that party identification, at least as measured by the standard 
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seven-point scale, is affected by short-term forces. In particular, 
Fiorina (1979) found that between 1974 and 1976 respondents' 
partisanship changed in accordance with their overall ratings of the 
president, their views on the Nixon pardon, and their assessments of 
the government's performance in managing the economy. Brody's (1977) 
study generated similar findings. His analyses, however, strongly 
indicated that most of the instability is in the strength component, 
e. g. movements from "strong" Democrat to "weak" Democrat; there was 
very little change, on the other hand, in the basic direction of 
identification, e. g. movements from Democrat to Republican. In 
specifying partisan predispositions, therefore, the following 
procedures shall be used: 1) When panel data are available, the 
respondent's vote in the previous elections will be specified;
8 
2) When only cross-sectional data are available, the partisanship 
indicators will incorporate only the directional component. 9 
The second matter to be considered is the fact that both the 
personal and national level indicators of concern over inflation and 
unemployment are sensitive to only the presence of these problems, and 
not their absence. It may be that voters reward one party or the 
other for dealing successfully with inflation or unemployment. Or it 
may be that voters punish but do not reward (Bloom and Price, 1975) . 
Success of this nature, however, would be indicated by the percentage 
of respondents naming inflation or unemployment as a serious problem 
approaching zero. An analysis based upon these indicators, though, 
can only detect voters reacting to the presence of either inflation or 
unemployment by favoring the candidates .of the party whose priorities 
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match their own. Estimation will thus be confined to those years in 
which inflation or unemployment was bad enough to prompt a significant 
number of respondents (over 10 percent) to cite one of these problems 
at either the personal or national level. These years are 1958, 1960, 
and 1970 through 1978. 
Estimation 
The following analysis is a simple one. The probit model to 
be estimated is of the form: 
VP,
C 





NEk + u) 
where �,C • respondent's reported vote for president or
congressman, taking on the value of 0 if 







• a constant term. 
• a dummy variable which, when only cross-sectional 
data are available (1966, 1970, 1972, 1978),  takes 
on the value of l if the respondent identifies with 
Republican party (as either a strong or weak 
identifier, or as an Independent leaning Republican) , 
0 otherwise. When panel data are available, however, 
(1958, 1960, 1974, and 1976) the respondent's vote 
in the previous election is used. Thus this variable 
takes on the value of l if the vote was Republican, 
0 otherwise. 
• the same as above, except it registers Democratic 
identifiers or respondents who voted Democratic in 
the previous elections. A reference group is thus 
composed of respondents who, in years in which cross­
sectional data are used, are Independents, or, when 
panel data are used, had not voted in the previous 
election. 
• in 1972, 1974, and 1976 a battery of dummy variables, 
one for each of the categories of personal economic 
problems whick were coded. The reference groups are 
composed of those respondents who either reported no
economic problems or no problems whatsoever. In other 
years the same personal finances and head of household's 
unemployment terms used previously are included. 
NE a k 
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a battery of dummy variables, one for each of the 
categories of perceived national economic problems 
which were coded. As above, the reference groups are 
composed of respondents who did not cite an economic 
problem. 
u � a randomly distributed error term. 
Results are presented in Table 4. As before, the top numbers 
in each entry are probit estimates, the numbers in parentheses below 
them are standard errors. Democratic votes were coded 0 and Republicn 
votes 1, so negative signs are pro-Democratic and positive signs pro-
Republican. 
[Table 4 about here] 
At the personal level, results were pretty much the same as in 
the previous analysis. Coefficients of the personal finances and head 
of household unemployment terms, in fact, were vitually unchanged. 
Thus the head of household unemployment variable continued to have a 
consistent but usually small pro-Democratic impact upon voting. 
Substituting the personal economic problem items for these measures 
provides some additional support for the policy-oriented hypotheses. 
As before, the most impressive figures are for the unemployment 
variable � the signs of all five estimates are pro-Democratic in 
direction, and most estimates are fairly large. True, none are 
statistically significant, but the small size of the categories would 
make conventional significance levels difficult to achieve. 
The inflation side of the hypothesis is supported at the 
personal level in that every estimate of the inflation term is more 
positive and thus more pro-Republican than the correponding 
unemployment term. This is much more due to the consistent, pro-
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Democratic direction of the unemployment terms, however; most 
estimates for the inflation terms did not differ noticeably from those 
of the neutral, nondescript reference groups. The one bright spot is 
the 1972 president election, where the sign was in the correct 
direction and statistically significant. Apparently the only 
Democratic candidate to be punished by voters who felt personally 
injured by inflation was the unfortunate George McGovern. There is 
not very much to report concerning tne other personal economic 
problems included in the analysis. In general, estimates for the 
effect of a declining real income fell in between the inflation and 
unemployment terms, with respondents voting slightly more Democratic 
than the former but somewhat more Republican than the latter. 
Estimates of the taxes term were erratic in direction, while those for 
the general economic problems category did not differ much from zero. 
Turning to perceptions of national economic problems, the 
unemployment side of the policy-oriented hypothesis again receives 
strong empirical backing. Voters who named unemployment the most 
serious national economic problem gave considerably more support to 
Democratic presidential candidates in 1960 and 1976 and to that 
party's congressional candidates in 1958. To be sure, the size of the 
probit estimates in these three elections were not overwhelming. On 
the whole they were not quite as large as estimates for the personal 
unemployment terms. This means that for any one individual, being 
personally affected by unemployment related difficulties will probably 
have a slightly larger impact upon his or her vote than simply 
perceiving unemployment to be a serious national problem. But as 
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pointed out earlier, the number of voters who perceived unemployment 
to be nationally troublesome in these years was a large multiple of 
the number for whom it was personally troublesome. In 1976 the 
national level measure included over eight times as many voters as the 
personal level measure; it was over three times as large in 1960, and 
over six times as large in 1958. Taking this into account, it is 
clear that in elections which follow severe recessions (1958 and 1976) 
or periods of slow growth (1960), the electoral impact of unemployment 
derives mainly from voters who see it as a pressing national problem, 
and not from those who have been personally affected. 
As was the case at the level of personal economic problems, 
though, the inflation side of the policy-oriented hypothesis does not 
fare as well. The strongest support for it was received in 1966, when 
the large number of respondents (16 percent of the sample) who cited 
inflation as the nation's worst economic problem were considerably 
more likely to vote Republican. At the present juncture it seems hard 
to believe that the 2. 8 percent rise in consumer prices that year 
triggered such a reaction, but this was a major spurt compared to the 
average 1. 3 percent of the previous five years. In the 1960 
presidential election the estimate was also statistically significant. 
But in all five elections from 1970 on -- all years in which large 
percentages of voters named inflation -- the greater level of support 
they were predicted to give Republican candidates was not forthcoming. 
Similarly -- at least in the elections analyzed in Table 4 -­
respondents who believed more government programs were needed to 
alleviate serious national problems did not appear to differ 
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systematically in their voting decisions from those who believed too 
much government spending or taxation was to blame for the nation's 
difficulties. 10 It should be noted, though, that the former category 
was very small from 1972 on, and that the latter categories never 
contained more than a small percentage of respondents. The final 
categories were composed of those respondents who mentioned some 
general or miscellaneous economic problem at either the personal or 
national level. For the most part such concerns had no effect upon 
voting. The only glimmer of an impact occurred in 1972, when voters 
in this category at the national level gave greater support to the 
Democratic challenger, George McGovern. 
One last point deserves attention, and that is that the 
policy- oriented hypotheses receive much more support early in the 
congressional election series than it does later on. In the first 
three or four equations reported in Table 4 the hypotheses do not fare 
badly. As mentioned earlier, the Republicans paid dearly for the 1958 
recession; over a third of the voters in that year believed 
unemployment was the most important national economic problem, and 
they were significantly more likely to cast their ballots for 
Democratic congressio�al candidates. The inflation hypothesis was 
strongly supported in 1966, and although not statisticlly significant, 
the signs of the national inflation and unemployment terms were 
clearly in the predicted direction as late as 1970. To be sure, this 
first set of elections contain some anomalous results as well. 
Estimates of the 1966 national unemployment term and 1960 more 
government programs term were statistically significant but in the 
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opposite direction as predicted. On the whole, though, results of the 
first half of congressional elections equations estimated in Table 4 
composed a somewhat attenuated and more erratic version of the pattern 
of findings obtained in the analysis of presidential elections. 
This is not the case in the second half of the congressional 
election series. In the five elections equations beginning with 1970, 
only one national problems term -- more government spending in 1976 -­
is statistically significant, and its sign is in the opposite 
direction as predicted. As the virtually random patterns of the signs 
of the various terms indicate, after 1970 the particular economic 
problems respondents cited did not appear to affect their voting 
choices in any consistent fashion. Admittedly, the break between the 
first set of elections and the second set has probably been 
exaggerated. Looking across the entire series in Table 4, however, it 
seems clear that voters' perceptions of national economic problems no 
longer have a significant impact upon their voting decisions in 
congressional elections. 
This disappearance at the congressional level of policy­
oriented voting based upon perceived national economic problems is 
consistent with a growing body of literature on the 
"denationalization" of congressional elections over the past few 
decades (Burnham, 1974, Mann, 1978). Most researchers in this area 
attribute this denationalization to a substantial increase in the 
electoral advantage enjoyed by incumbents (Mayhew, 1974, Fiorina, 
1977). Such an increase in the advantage of incumbent congressmen, 
regardless of their party, would make individual congressional 
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elections less sensitive to cross-district national forces, including, 
of course, perceptions of particular national economic problems. 
Summary of Results 
This analysis has uncovered considerable evidence of policy­
oriented voting vis-a-vis inflation and unemployment. To be sure, the 
inflation side of the hypothesis garnered only weak, scattered 
support. There were a few instances at both the personal and national 
levels of inflation-sensitive voters supporting the Republicans, but 
that is all. Furthermore, policy- oriented voting in congressional 
elections appears to have declined considerably over the past decade 
or so. The preponderance of the evidence, though, was of voters 
reacting against Republican candidates because of their concern over 
unemployment. Voters who had personally experienced unemployment gave 
a modest but consistent boost to Democratic candidates in virtually 
every election. This effect was heavily supplemented in years of high 
unemployment by the large percentage of voters who felt unemployment 
was a serious national problem and consequently voted heavily 
Democratic as well. 
Now this does not take anything away from the evidence in 
favor of incumbency-oriented voting in response to economic 
fluctuations; support for that hypothesis, reviewed earlier in this 
paper, is strong and pervasive. But it is reasonable to conclude that 
in the period studied incumbency- oriented voting was importantly 
supplemented by policy-oriented voting, and that such voting occurred 
primarily in response to unemployment. 
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This paper will turn now to aggregate data, and seek to 
determine whether or not evidence in favor of policy-oriented voting 
exist s at this level. More specifically, this section will compare 
the performance of models which incorporate policy-oriented 
distinctions with models which specify incumbency-oriented effects 
only. 
III. A COMPARISON OF INCUMBENCY-ORIENTED AND POLICY-ORIENTED MODELS:
I 
A NEW LOOK AT THE AGGREGATE LEVEL EVIDENCE 
Obviously there is no easy, direct way to proceed from 
individual- level analyses to aggregates. Thie is especially true 
with the sort of individual-level measures examined in this paper. 
These measures only register whether or not individuals at a given 
point in time see inflation, unemployment, or some other problem is 
seen ae the most serious problem facing themselves or the country ae a 
whole. Data of this nature tells us little about the dynamics of 
public concern over inflation or unemployment. le it the simple rates 
of unemployment and inflation which the electorate reacts to? A 
strong argument can be made that 8 percent unemployment or 10 percent 
inflation is bad regardlees , of whether �he rate is moving up or down. 
An equally strong case can be made that it is changes in the rates of 
inflation and unemployment which matter. In fact, it is often argued 
that a steady, fully anticipated inflation rate is nearly as good ae a 
steady price level (Okun (1975), though, characterizes the goal of 
"steady inflation" as a "mirage"). 
Fortunately, evidence from some previous studies bears on this 
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point. Fair (1978) found that votes for president were powerfully 
predicted by changes in the unemployment rate. And Hibbs' (1979) 
analysis clearly shows that the American public's aversion to 
unemployment vis-a-vie inflation is extremely insensitive to the level 
of unemployment, but very sensitive to changes in the unemployment 
rate. Furthermore, the steady secular increase in the rate of 
inflation from the mid-Sixties suggests that change in the rate of 
inflation is the appropriate measure. As shown earlier in this paper, 
t he jump in the inflation rate from about 1 percent to 3 percent in 
1966 triggered a significant public reaction; today, of course, a drop 
to even 12 percent would be welcome. 
This study, therefore, will examine the electoral impact of 
changes in the unemployment and inflation rates. It would not seem 
prudent to extend the time series back before the emergence of the 
current party system, at which time the parties' macroeconomic 
priorities emerged as well. The data base used here is t herefore the 
22 congressional elections since 1932 (the war years of 1942 and 1944 
are excluded). Finally, the dependent variable to be examined is the 
change in the Republican share of the two- part y vote from the 
previous election. 
Three different equations were estimated, and the results are 
reported in Table 5. Equation 1 specifies incumbency-oriented voting 
only. This was done by simply multiplying the change in unemployment 
and change in inflation terms by an incumbency index, which took on 
the value of 1 when a Republican was president, -1 when a Democrat was 
president. Both terms were in the correct direction, both were 
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statistically significant, and the R2 was a respectable . 55. As have 
several previous studies, this study also shows strong support for 
incumbency-oriented voting. 
Equation 2, though, represents a clear improvement over 
Equation 1. It allows estimates of the change in unemployment terms 
to vary across Democratic and Republican administrations. (This is 
done by multiplying the change in unemployment term by dummy variables 
which reflect the party of the incumbent president. R takes on the 
value of 1 if he is a Republican, 0 otherwise. Similarly, D is 1 if 
he is a Democrat, 0 otherwise. ) This modification produces an 
improvement in explained sum of squares which is significant at the 
. 05 level (F1, 18 • 4. 50) . The positive sign of the Democrat­
unemployment term and negative sign of the Republican-unemployment 
term indicate that incumbents of both parties have been hurt by rises 
in unemployment and have benefited from drops in unemployment. 11 As 
noted earlier in this paper, though, increases in un�mployment 
occurred during only two of the thirteen election years in this period 
in which the Democrats controlled the White House, but occurred during 
five of the nine election years in which the incumbent president was a 
Republican. The difference in the magnitude of the estimates 
indicates that when they are the incumbents, the Republicans' 
electoral fortunes are far more sensitive to changes in unemployment. 
In particular, any rise in unemployment would hurt the Republicans 
nearly twice as badly as it would the Democrats were they the 
incumbents. 
Finally, Equation 4 simply allows the effects of changes in 
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the rate of inflation to vary across the different parties' 
administrations. Although the estimates suggest that Democratic 
incumbents are hurt worse by a rise in inflation than are Republicans, 
the improvement in fit this affords is quite small and insignificant. 
In short, the conclusion to be drawn from the aggregate level is the 
same as the conclusion drawn at the individual level: during the 
period studied incumbency-oriented voting in response to fluctuations 
in economic conditions was importantly supplemented by policy-oriented 
voting, but such voting primarily occurred in response to 
unemployment. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
That the amount of support voters extend to candidates of the 
incumbent party is responsive to fluctuations in economic conditions 
constitutes one of the most important findings of recent political 
research. Its implications for empirical democratic theory are clear. 
As Kramer (1971) put it " • election outcomes are in substantial 
part responsive to objective changes occurring under the incumbent 
party; they are not 'irrational, ' or random, or solely the product of 
past loyalties and habits, or of campaign rhetoric and merchandising" 
(p. 140) . How well the incumbents do at the polls, then, depends in 
part on how well they have done in off ice. 
But by emphasizing incumbency-oriented voting so strongly, 
this research has paid insufficient attention to important differences 
in the relative priorities the major parties have assigned to the 
conflicting goals of full employment and price stability. As Hibbs 
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(1977) has shown, such differences in macroeconomic priorities have 
important distributional consequences. Thie study has shown that 
these dif ferencee in priorities have had important electoral 
consequences as well. The evidence it has generated indicates that a 
significant amount of voting in response to both personal economic 




1. As of this writing the present Democratic administration would seem 
to have adopted this strategy. President Carter has fully supported 
the Federal Reserve'e policies of raising interest rates to record 
levels, and has vowed to balance the FY1981 budget. This would appear 
to contradict the premise that the parties' macroeconomic priorities
differ and thus undermine the case for policy-oriented voting. 
However, it does not. The argument is that their relative priorities
differ, not that the Democrats only care about unemployment, never 
about inflation, while the Republicans care only about inflation and 
are oblivious to unempioyment. It is hard to believe a Reagan or Ford 
would be less zealous than Carter at battling inflation, or more 
concerned about unemployment. Finally, up to this point Carter has 
pursued policies, which, compared to those of any conceivable Republican 
administration ( i . e. Ford or Reagan) have produced a relatively low 
unemployment-high inflation configuration. 
2. These data were made available by the Inter-University Coneortimn for 
Political and Social Research. Neither the original collectors of the 
data not the consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or 
interpretations presented here. 
3. The changes made in their original analysis were as follows: 1) 
Probit analysis was used instead of ordinary least squares regression . 
Thie is a preferable procedure given the dichotomous nature of the 




presidential as well as congressional elections. 3) Their construction 
of the unemployment variable allowed bouts of joblessness which had 
occurred up to two years prior to the interview to be counted. This 
period is probably inordinately long. The point here is to isolate 
those voters for whom unemployment is a serious personal problem. For_ 
individuals who had been out of work two years ago but had been 
steadily employed since, this is probably not the case, and to include 
them in the "unemployed" category could attenuate estimates of the 
variable's effect. In the elections ia which their measure used the 
previous two years as a time frame, this analysis will therefore 
r educe it to the previous six months. 
In the years in which panel data were available (1958, 1960, 1974, 
and 1976) dummy variables registering the respondents' vote in the 
previous election were used. In other years partisanship was specified 
by a pair of nominal party identification dummies. Results were 
virtually identical, however, when the nominal party identification 
dummies were substituted for the previous vote terms in the four panel 
years. 
This recoding was done originally as part of an intensive analysis 
of the impact of personal economic problems upon voting. The results 
of this work are reported in the author's unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation. 
One of the major problems with the 1976 code was that complaints 
about unemployment were lumped together with all other job-related 
references, which ranged from despising the public (frequently 
mentioned by sales clerks) to having to work too many hours. It 
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turned out that only about half of the references in the employment­
related category were about unemployment. The 1972-74 codes often 
contained a wide variety of responses. One category, for example, 
contained references to inflation, taxes, governmental waste, and the 
cost of college. These responses obviously needed to be disaggregated. 
The staff at CPS was extremely accommodating and helped make the 
task of recoding the interviews much less ardous than it might have 
been. I would like to thank Warren Hiller for his approval of the 
project, and Ann Robinson, Alice Rayes, and Maria Sanchez for their 
valuable assistance. 
6. In all studies except 1958, respondents were subsequently asked which
of the problems they had mentioned they considered most important. 
The CPS coders were thus able to order problem reports according to 
perceived importance, and the highest ranking economic problem (if any 
were mentioned) was included in Table 3. The procedure followed in the 
1958 study was a little more complicated. Af ter respondents were asked 
whether they thought "problems here at home in the United States" had 
gotten better in the past year, gotten worse, or stayed the same, they 
were asked to report the particular problems they had in mind. Only 
the reported problems of those who believed things had stayed the same 
or had worsened were coded, but about 85 percent of the sample fell into 
these two categories. As Table 3 indicates, inflation and unemployment 
were the only two economic problems which could be extracted from the 
CPS codes for that year. The "no problem mentioned" category is 
inordinately large in 1958 because responses relating to defense and 




percent who felt the u . s .  domestic situation had been improving. 
One criticism of previous work in this area is that the statistical 
models employed are so simple that they are possibly under-specified. 
Fiorina (1978) , however, indicates that the economic conditions items 
are not strongly correlated with other noneconomic issue items. Thus 
specification bias should not present any problems for the analyses 
undertaken in t his study. 
"Previous election" means the previou� congressional election when 
congressional elections are analyzed but the previous presidential 
election when presidential elections are analyzed. In 1976, for 
example, the previous election considered in the congressional equation 
was 1974, but for the 1976 presidential race the respondents' reported 
vote for president in 1972 was specified. 
9. Cross-tabular analyses revealed that change in respondents' party 
identification from 1974 to 1976 was only slightly affected by their 
perceptions of national economic problems. Furthermore, what little 
systematic change t here was occurred in the strength components 
perceiving inflation to be the nation's worst problem tended to 
strengthen the identification of Republicans, while unemployment 
tended to strengthen the identification of those who had already been 
Democrats in 1974. So while the nominal party dummy specification used 
here (it is the same as the specification used in Fiorina (1978) and 
Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) ) is appropriate, the results which are 
generated would not differ much if the seven point scale were used 
instead. 
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10. Findings concerning the effects of these public sector issues were 
markedly different in the 1964 and 1968 elections, however. In these
years the percentages of respondents in these categories were quite high, 
while the percentages in the inflation and unemployment categories were 
very small. Furthermore, estimates for the "more government programs" 
terms were strongly pro-Democratic in direction, while voters in the 
"too much government spending" and "taxes" categories in 1964 and 1968 
gave substantially greater support to Republican candidates.
11. Kramer and Goodman's findings are based upon a re-analysis of data
utilizing a model developed by Arcelus and Meltzer (1975) .  They had 
criticized this model on several fundamental grounds, however, and so 




THE EFFECT OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD ' S  UNEMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE 
AND TREND IN FAMILY FINANCES ON VOTING IN CONGRESSIONAL 
AND PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS , 1956-19 7 8
YEAR �RES IDENTIAL ELECTIONS CONGRE S S I ONAL ELECTIONS 
Bead ' &  Unemp loymen t Fami ly Bead ' &  Unempl oyment Family 
E erience a Finances EXPeriencea Finances 
1956 - . 097 - . 134** - . 659 - . 087** 
( . 513) (.  031) ( . 597 ) ( . 034)  
1958 - - -. 4 13* - . 103** 
( .  24  3) ( . 036) 
1960 - . 659** - . 046 - . 335 - . 0 19 
( . 2 4 1 )  ( . 030) ( . 2 7 4 )  ( .  033) 
1962 - - - . 2 4 4  . 037 
( . 230) ( . 04 2 )  
1964 - . 5 79 . 040 - . 148 - . 014 
( . 355)  ( .  033)  ( . 314)  ( . 035 ) 
1966 - - - . 630 - . 077* 
( .  560) ( .  036) 
1968b . 130 . 134** - . 4 1 1  . 037 
( . 305 ) ( .  038) ( .  308) ( . 048 ) 
1970 - - - . 2 11 - . 008 
( . 308) ( .  048) 
1972 - . 52 3** - . 078* - . 395* - . 02 2  
( ; 150) ( . 03 7 )  ( . 179 ) ( .  041)  
1974 - - - . 04 1  . 032 
( . 155 ) ( .  030) 
1976 - . 2 10 - . 081** - . 039 - . 131** 
( . 131)  ( .  029)  ( . 1 5 7 )  ( .  034) 
1978 - - - . 09 3  - . 007 
( . 132)  ( . 026) 
** - p < . 01 ;  * = p < . 05 
a .  In a l l  e l e c t i ons be tween 1958 and 1964 , as we l l  as in 1968 and 1970 , 
this variab l e  ind i ca t ed whether or not the re sponden t ' s  head o f  
hous ehold had been un emp l oy e d  in the p rev i ous six mon ths . From 1972  
o n  t h e  t ime f r ame w a s  the previ ous ye a r ,  an d  in 1956 a n d  1966 i t
coul d only b e  ascert ained whe t h e r  o r  not the h e a d  w a s  curren t l y  out 
of work . 
b .  Wallace vot e r s  were e x c luded f r om the pre s i d en t i a l  e l e c t i on ana lys i s  
in 196 8 .  
·-::. 
TABLE 2 
MOST IMPORTANT PERSONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 
(in percentages ) 
Inf lation 
Declining Real Income 
Unemp loyment Related 
Taxes 
General of Mis c .  
Economic Prob lems 
Nonecomoni c  Prob lems 
No Problem Ment ioned 
Total 
Na
1 9 7 2  
14 . 4
4 . 8










4 . 4  
1 . 3
19 . 2
2 4 . 4
13 . 4
100 . 0  
( 2 5 2 3 )  
4 4  
1976  









a .  Ns  are  b ased on the 1972 , 19 7 4 , and 1976 cros s-sectional weighted 
s amples of all respondents . No imp ortant turnout effects were 
present , however ,  so the per centages reported here are vitually 
identical when vot ers only are considered . Weights are not used 
in any of the probit analysi s . 
1958 
In flation 6 . 4  




Le s s  Government -
S p end ing 
General Economic -
Prob l ems 
Noneconomic 18 . 2
Prob lem 
No Prob l em 4 1 .  5a 




MOST IMPORTANT NATIONAL ECONOMI C PROBLEMS , 195 8-19 7 8
( in per centages )  
1960 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 
3 . 7  1 . 2  15 . 9  2 . 6  14 . 2  20 . 0  5 0 . 2 
11. 6 6 . 9  2 . 6  2 , 3  7 . 9  6 . 3  6 . 6  
4 . 7  4 . 3  6 . 4  3 .  7 6 . 1  5 . 5  0 . 3  
2 0 . 3 2 7 . 3 19 . 8  16 . 1  2 6 . 1 10 . 9 1 .  7 
3 . 5  3 . 6  7 . 2  2 . 5  1 . 9  3 . 3  1 . 0 
2 . 9  0 . 6  1 .  9 0 , 8  4 . 9  8 . 0  26 . 5  
42 . l 37 . 9  38 . 5  69 . 4  34 . 6 42 . 7 10 . 8  
1 1 .  2 1 8 .  2 7 . 7  2 . 6  4 . 3  3 . 3  2 . 9  
1514 1571 1291 1557 1580 1109 1624 
1976 
30 . 3 
32 . l
1 . 6  
4 . 2  
2 . 3  
14 . 1  
9 . 3  
6 . 1  
1217  
A .  The "no problem men t i on e d "  c a t e gory i n  1 9 5 8  i s  n o t  comparable t o  t h e  same c a t e g ory i n  the other y e a r s . 
See footn o t e  7 f o r  d e t a i l s ,  Column t ot al s  may not add exac t ly t o  100 percen t  because o f  rounding e r ror . 
-
1978 
5 2 . 2  
4 . 6  
2 . 5  
3 . 3  
2 . 6  
6 . 3  
2 3 . 8 




THE EFFECT OF PERS ONAL AND PERCEIVED NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 
ON VOTING IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS , 19 58-19 7 8  
Presidential Elections -Congreaa ional Elect ion• 
1960 1 9 7 2  1976 1958 1960 1966 1970 1 9 7 2  1974 1 9 7 6  
c , 207 . 56 7  - . 131 . 052 - . 149 , 053 - . 07 7  1 . 02 - . 498 - . 32 7  
Democrat - l . 08 .. - . 821>** -.  7 15** - . 964•* - . 759** - . 892 .. - . 831** - L oo•• - . 57 3** - . 293** 
( . 1 1 2 )  ( . 1 7 9 )  ( , 149) ( . 1 3 3 )  ( . 105) ( . 18 2 )  ( . 1 8 1 )  ( . 188) ( . 1 2 9 )  ( . 1 2 5 )  
Republican . 5 7 7 ** • 840•• • 7 31** . 998 .. 1. 2 7 • •  . 986•• l .  09** . 824** 1 . 1 2 * *  l . 1 7 * *  
( . 09 2 )  ( . 198) ( . 128) ( . 119) ( . 120) ( . 188) ( . 188) ( . 189) ( . 1 2 9 )  ( . 1 3 9 )  
Personal Economic Problems 
Faai ly Finance& - . 049* - - - . 105** - . 0 2 1  - . 07 7 * *  - , 008 - - -
( . 030) (. 036) ( .  033) ( , 03 7 )  ( . 04 9 )  
Head o f  - . 638** - - - . 387 - . 344 -.  7 2 0  - . 193 - - -
Household ' a  ( . 2 4 4 )  ( . 2 4 5 )  ( ,  2 7 5 )  ( , 5 5 5 )  ( . 2 2 2 )  
Uneaplo,,.ent 
Inf lation - . 2 73* - . 03 7  - - - - - . 024 - . 03 7  - . 2 4 4 •  
( . 166) ( . 1 1 6 )  ( . 1 7 5 )  ( . 1 1 6 )  ( . 136) 
Declining Real - - . 087 - . 152 - - - - - . 187 - . 2 3 4  - . 1 3 7  
lncoae ( .  2 3 3 )  ( . 208) ( . 2 9 6 )  ( . 1 7 6 )  ( . 2 2 9 )  
Uneaploy.ent - - . 34 6  - . 338 - - - - - .  5 3 7  - . 2 1 4  - . 409 
( . 2 9 6 )  ( ,  2 58) (. 4 1 2 )  ( . 2 8 7 )  ( . 30 4 )  
Taxes - , 070 - . 04 7  - - - - - . 389 -b . 2 3 5  
( .  2 3 4 )  ( ,  2 3 3 )  ( . 250) ( . 2 56) 
General Econoai c - . 067 - . 088 I - - - - - . 0�4 - . 104 - . 0 10 Prob leas ( . 1 4 5 )  ( . 1 2 3 )  ( . 159) ( . 1 4 2 )  ( . 14 7 )  
1.at ional Economic Problems 
Inf l a t ion • 395* , 040 . 104 - . 035 . 1 76 • 3 2 5* . 2 16 - . 2 7 7  . 0 )7 . 103 
( .  2 3 1 )  ( . 1 4 3 )  ( .  148) (.  2 1 1 )  ( . 269) ( . 165 ) ( . 1 7 1 )  ( . 163) ( . 167 ) ( .  17 5) 
Unemployment - . 2 5 7 *  , 02 2  - . 3 6 1 * *  - . 289•• . 01 5  . 6 9 4 *  - . 162 . 07 4  . 04 4  - . 2 1 8  
( . 138) ( . 2 20) ( . 148) ( . 1 10) ( . 1 5 1 )  ( . 3 1 7 )  ( . 2 2 2 ) ( , 2 4 6 )  ( .  2 3 7 )  ( .  169) 
Taxes . 010 . 360 -b - . 1 0 1  . 05 3  - . 090 - . 1 2 3  -b -b 
( . 20 4 )  ( . 2 6 7 )  ( . 2 4 1 )  ( . 2 4 2 )  ( ,  2 7 2 )  ( . 2 6 3 )  
Ho r e  Govern,...n t - . 06 5  -. 0 7 2  . 096 - . 194* - . 032 . 03 1  - . 1 35 -b . 94 3•• 
Programs ( . 103) ( . 1 7 6) ( . 2 6 5 )  ( . 1 1 7 )  ( . 15 1 )  ( . 1 4 4 )  ( . 180) ( . 307 ) 
r= 
Less Govel"'119en t  - . 160 . 198 . 269 - - . 057 - . 1 60 . 4 25 - . 1 4 1  -b - . 1 1 5  
Spending ( . 206) ( . 308) ( . 3 2 9 )  ( .  2 2 7 ) ( . 198) ( . 3 7 7 )  ( .  3 2 1 )  ( .  354)  
General Econ01Dic . 0 10 - . 4 1 7 * . 029 - . 1 7 3  -b - . 061 - . 2 1 7  . 1 62 . H 6 
Problems ( .  2 2 2 )  ( . 198) ( . 1 7 1 )  ( .  2 3 6 )  ( . 22 7 )  ( .  2 1 7 )  ( . 178) ( . 1 9 6 )  
N 1 1 4 9  760 9 2 3  8 2 5  987 6 7 7  683 692 863 689 
1978 
- . 159 
- . 604** 
( . 140) 
. 682** 
( . 1 4 4 )  
- . 008 
( . 02 6 )  
- . 094 
( . 13 3 )  
. Ol l  
( . 108) 
- . 106 
( . 25 1 )  
. 1 7 9  
( . 260) 
. 2 79 
( .  2 7 6 )  
. 1 10 
( . 2 3 3 )  
. 04 7  
( . 1 6 7 )  
1009 
a .  These terms are nominal p a r t y  ; d er. t i f icat ion in 196 6 ,  1 9 7 0 ,  1 9 7 2 ,  and 1 9 7 8 .  I n  other years t hey i nd i ca t e  the responden t � '  v o t e  in
t he  previous elect ion . 
b .  Low N .  
* '  • p < • 01 ; • •  p < • 05 . 
47 
TABLE 5 
A COMPARI SON OF INCUMBENCY-ORIENTED AND POLICY-ORIENTED MODELS
I • (UR - UR ) 
t t-1 
R • (URt - URt-l) 
D • (UR - UR ) 
t t-1 
I • ( IR - IR ) 
t t-1 
R • ( IR - IR ) t t-1 
D • ( IR - IR ) t t-1 
R
2 
d . w .  
�L� 
1 
- . 0 188** 
(. 004)  
-
-
- . 0034** 




2 . 47 
** = p < . 01 ;  * = p < . OS .
2 3 
- . 0 2 6 1* *  - . 0233** 
( .  005 ) ( .  006) 
. 0139** . 0145** 
( .  004) ( .  004 ) 
- . 0046 *  
( . 0017 ) 
- - . 0032 
( . 00 2 7 )  
- . 0056** 
( . 00 2 2 )  
. 64 3  . 65 3  
2 . 46 2 . 38 
48 49 
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